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War and the Business Corporation
Eric W. Orts*
ABSTRACT

This Article addresses the relationship between modern
warfare and business corporations. The Article begins by
considering the nature of war, emphasizing the effects of
globalizationand the changing importance of nationalboundaries.
The Article reviews leading theories of war and focuses on how the
growth of multinational corporations in economic and political
power has begun to rival the power of nation-states. Next, the
Article addresses the nature of the business corporation in the
context of modern war by surveying standard legal, ethical, and
economic understandings of corporate governance. The Article
concludes by arguing that the recognition of the moral and
political issues of war andpeace and their connection to corporate
governance requires a qualificationof the shareholders-onlylawand-economics view of the corporation. Far from an "end of
history," contemplating the interactions between business
corporations and modern warfare suggests that much work
remains to be done to construct the institutions needed to achieve
the elusive goal of global peace as well as economic prosperity.
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If looks could kill, they probably will,
In games without frontiers-warwithout tears.
Peter Gabriel'
This Article addresses the topic of war, which is not ordinarily
considered germane to academic studies of corporate law. 2 A few cases
from the Vietnam era are sometimes included in contemporary
corporation law casebooks. 3 In an academic milieu dominated by
considerations of economic costs and benefits, however, mainstream
corporate law teachers tend recently to avoid thinking seriously about
issues of business ethics and social responsibility. Two of our most
prominent professors of corporate law, for example, have gone so far as
to claim that "the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of
corporate law among the business, government, and legal elites in key
commercial jurisdictions" has resulted in a world in which "[tlhere is no
longer any serious competitor" to this view of the corporation. 4 "The
triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its
principal competitors," these two authors conclude, "is now assured, even
if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago."5 They
therefore declare "the end of history in corporate law" and predict that
"the ideological and competitive attractions of the standard model will
become indisputable" with "convergence in most aspects of the law and
practice of corporate governance ... sure to follow."

1.
PETER GABRIEL, Gaines Without Frontiers,on PETER GABRIEL (3) (Charisma
Records, Ltd. 1980).
2.
Cf.Bert S. Prunty, Jr., Love and the Business Corporation,46 VA. L. REV. 467,
467-68 (1960) (discussing changes in public and judicial attitudes that brought about a
shift in corporate law to allow corporations to make charitable donations).
E.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971)
3.
(refusing a shareholder's right to corporate records regarding weapons and munitions
manufacture when request is made for a political purpose, namely, opposing U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam War); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (addressing SEC's decision on
allowing Dow Chemical Company's refusal to submit a shareholder proposal on the use of
napalm "on or against human beings" on grounds of a securities regulation exception for
"ordinary business" matters).
4.
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Endof Historyfor CorporateLaw,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
5.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 439, 468. The unspoken reference is to the controversial claim in social
6.
theory more generally of "an end of history" after the Cold War. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1993); HOWARD WILLIAMS ET AL., FRANCIS

FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY (1999). Other leading academics in corporate law
agree that a convergence in corporate governance regimes is likely to occur globally, but
disagree about the form of this convergence. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Futureas
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications,93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 650-53 (1999) (arguing against "formal convergence,"
but predicting "functional convergence" through securities regulation); Ronald J. Gilson,
Globalizing CorporateGovernance: Convergence of Form or Function,49 AM. J. COMP. L.
329, 333-34 (2001) (arguing against Hansmann and Kraakman's thesis of "formal
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The triumphalist view of shareholders diber alles in business
corporations should be one of the first casualties of a serious
consideration of the nature of war in our modern, increasingly global
society. 7 The modern nature of war so forcefully brought home in the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, as well as the
ensuing Allied military action in Afghanistan and elsewhere, should
remind scholars that corporations do not exist separately from the
problems of human society. We must consider the role that business
corporations play in the great games of international war and peace, as
well as less deadly economic competition.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the nature of war,
with an emphasis on the effects of globalization and the changing
importance of national boundaries. It reviews some leading theories of
war and how they relate to the business corporation. In particular, it
focuses on the fast, recent growth of large multinational corporations
and their ascent to economic and political power to rival many nationstates in comparative size and influence. Economic globalization and the
multinational corporations that support it have significant implications
for theories of modern war.
Part II reconsiders the perennially important topic of the nature
and purposes of the business corporation in the context of modern war.
It reviews the standard understanding of corporate governance involving
not only economic obligations, but also legal constraints and ethical

convergence," but identifying other trends toward "functional," "contractual," or "hybrid"
convergence that may achieve similar results). For a more direct challenge to Hansmann
and Kraakman's end-of-history-in-corporate-law thesis, see Douglas M. Branson, The Very
UncertainProspect of "Global" Convergence in CorporateGovernance, 34 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 321, 330-31 (2001) (arguing that this view is "chauvinistic," "Americanocentric," and
supported largely only by "bald assertions").
7.
Not all commentators share the reductionist "shareholders only" model of the
firm. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Rents and their CorporateConsequences, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1463, 1468, 1480 (2001) (observing that "players inside the firm-shareholders, managers,
employees--compet[e] to get a piece" of the economic action and noting the existence, at
least in some countries, of an "anti-shareholder-value ideology"); Robert B. Thompson,
Shareholdersas Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Powerto "JustSay
No,"
67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1005-06 (1999) (noting that "shareholder wealth
maximization remains at the center of the purpose and objective of the corporation," but
recognizing competing theories and arguing for "more precise articulation" of the meaning
of "shareholder primacy" in different situations). In previous work, I have argued for a
view of the business firm that includes owners-both of equity and credit-as well as
managers and others with legal authority, including employees. Eric W. Orts, Shirking
and Sharking: A Legal Theory ofthe Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 298-314 (1998). I
have also argued for theories of corporate law that include considerations beyond those of
shareholders, including other constituent groups and ethical considerations. See Eric W.
Orts, Beyond Shareholders:InterpretingCorporateConstituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 14 (1992); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565 (1993). For a typology of different theories of "social and
economic organization" that remains relevant to competing theories of corporate law, see
Roberta Romano, Metapoliticsand CorporateLaw Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 925-50
(1984).
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considerations. Accepted restatements of the fundamental principles of
corporate law are not, as some academic commentators might prefer,
encomia to the single-minded pursuit of economic values. Instead, they
recognize the importance of law and ethics as components to the
development of corporate purposes. In this context, the legal and ethical
obligations of business corporations with respect to issues of war and
peace are considered.
Part III draws some conclusions from this consideration of the
nature of war and business corporations. Briefly, it argues that a
serious consideration of the moral and political importance of issues of
war and peace in modern society requires a major qualification to the
standard law-and-economics, shareholders-only view of the corporation.
An understanding of the important interconnections between modern
war and the business corporation reveals that theories of the social
nature and purposes of business corporations have not yet reached an
historical end. The Article concludes with some suggestions about future
directions for interdisciplinary research at the social intersections of war
and business corporations.
To expand on Peter Gabriel's lyrics quoted at the outset, economic
globalization has meant that businesses increasingly play in "games
without frontiers."8 Enhanced technological capabilities, as well as a
hardening of hearts arguably made possible by evolution of modern
forms of social organization, have also made possible "war without

8.
GABRIEL, supra note 1. As Joseph White has pointed out, the metaphor of the
game" is very commonly used in business settings. B. Joseph White, Remarks at
Conference on Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable Peace,
University of Michigan Business School, Nov. 3, 2001. War is also often conceived in terms
of game theories and studied through war games. See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE
STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 203-07, 223 (republished ed. 2001) (1959)
(describing war as one game among others played by states in international politics).
By referring to war and business as "games," I do not mean to trivialize either activity.
A colleague points out to me correctly that it is dangerous as well as misleading to think
of war and business merely as games. Both war and business are more serious than
children's games, as Peter Gabriel's ironic song lyrics suggest:
Hans plays with Lotte, Lotte plays with Jane;
Jane plays with Willi, Willi is happy again.
Suki plays with Leo, Sacha plays with Britt;
Adolf builts a bonfire, Enrico plays with it.

Andre has a red flag, Chiang Ching's is blue;
They all have hills to fly them on except for Lin Tai Yu.
Dressing up in costumes, playing silly games;
Hiding out in tree-tops shouting out rude names.
Gabriel, supra note 1. Although it may therefore be helpful for analytic purposes to think
about military and business strategy through the use of game theories or models, it is
important also to remember that real lives and livelihoods are at stake. Dealing in
strategic abstractions can-and often does-result in a rational and emotional
disconnection from practical realities.
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tears." This Article argues that human society should strive against the
economic, moral, and political outcome of perpetual global war, and
building the institutions necessary for peace should include attention to
the social structure of modern business corporations.

I. ON THE NATURE OF MODERN WAR

One basic principle that has not changed is that "war [is] not
healthy for children and other living things."1 0 A recent documentary
estimates that two million children have been killed in wars in the last
ten years.' Tragically, as seen in Afghanistan, Africa, and elsewhere,
the use of children as soldiers is "more and more common."' 12 Surely,
"the love of children, with their need for attention and care, is a moral
bond that should transcend every local and national barrier. '13 Leo
Tolstoy's view remains true today: "War is not polite recreation, but the
vilest thing in life, and we ought to understand that and not play at war.
14
We ought to accept it sternly and solemnly as a fearful necessity."'
Carl von Clausewitz probably remains the leading social theorist of
war, at least since the ancient Chinese writer, Sun Tzu, and the
ubiquitous European political theorist, Machiavelli. 15 "War," according
to Clausewitz, "is an instrument of policy."'1 6 It is, in fact, "policy itself,
which takes up the sword in place of the pen."'17 For Clausewitz, writing
in the early nineteenth century, war is simply extreme politics. War is a
"political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying
18
out of the same by other means.

9.
One might even argue that the history of military organization into armies,
navies, and other disciplined organizational forms is the story of divorcing moral
sensibilities from warfare. For an argument that Western superiority on the battlefield
lies precisely in its moral ability to inflict maximum destruction on enemies, see VICTOR
DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES IN THE RISE OF WESTERN

POWER (2001).
10.
This slogan was an anti-war protest in the 1960s. See, e.g., George Packer, The
Way We Live Now: Recapturing The Flag,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at
15.
11.
Wendy J. William, Listening to the Childrenof War, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 28,
2000, at S32 (reviewing the HBO documentary "Children in War").
12.
Herbert M. Howe, Global Order and the Privatizationof Security, 22 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 1, 1 (Summer/Fall 1998).
13.

ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN

RIGHTS 50 (2001).
14.
LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 732 (Constance Garnett trans., Modern Library
1940) (1864).
15.
See, e.g., SUN TzU, THE ART OF WAR (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1963); NICCOL
MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR (Ellis Farneworth trans., 2001).
16.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 410 (Anatole Rapoport ed., J.J. Graham
trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1832).
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at 119.

554

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:549

The theories of war advanced by Clausewitz, as well as Sun Tzu and
Machiavelli, remain popular today as they are applied in the field of
business strategy. 19 Presciently, Clausewitz described war "as a kind of
business competition on a great scale. '20 In his original theory of war,
Clausewitz subsumes private interests of business under the larger
rubric of "the interests generally of the whole community," though he
and "promote unfairly
recognizes that "policy may take a false direction"
2
the ambitious ends" of "private interests." '
Business firms-to the extent that they were just beginning to
develop independent social identities in the nineteenth century-were
properly considered instruments of the nation-states in which they were
based. 2 2 In the time of Clausewitz, the size and influence of business
corporations independent of the nation-states that chartered them were
for the most part negligible. 23 For much of the twentieth century as
well, this view of the subordinate relationship of business corporations

19.
See, e.g., CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGY: INSPIRATION AND INSIGHT FROM AMASTER
STRATEGIST (Tiha von Ghyczy et al. eds., with commentary 2001); THE RUTHLESS LEADER:
THREE CLASSICS OF STRATEGY AND POWER (Alistair MacAlpine ed., 2000) (including
Machiavelli's The Prince and Sun Tzu's The Art of War). See also ANTONY JAY,
MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI: DISCOVERING A NEW SCIENCE OF MANAGEMENT IN THE
TIMELESS PRINCIPLES OF STATECRAFT (1994) (advancing a theory of business management
based on Machiavelli's political theory); MARK MCNEILLY, SUN TZU AND THE ART OF
BUSINESS: SIX STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGERS (2000) (adapting Sun Tzu's theory to
modern business strategy); Survey of Management, The Return of von Clausewitz,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2002, at 18 (describing return of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to
popularity in strategic management thinking).
20.
CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 16, at 202-03.
21.
Id. at 404.
22.
For general historical accounts of the development of business enterprises,
including corporations, see STUART BRUCHEY, ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OFA
FREE PEOPLE (1990); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970).

23.
The modern corporate form of business organization traces its roots to the
government-chartered Dutch and English trading companies in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries' and the unchartered joint-stock companies of late seventeenth
century England. See, e.g., Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations:The
Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J.
COMP. L. 583, 589 (1999). Only in the late nineteenth century did business corporations
begin to acquire significant legal and constitutional independence from the nation-state.
For a good general history of this development in the United States, see HURST, supra note
22; Herbert Hovenkamp, The ClassicalCorporationin American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593 (1988). See also Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of
CorporateIllegality (With Notes on How CorporateLaw Could Reinforce InternationalLaw
Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1303-04 (2001) (observing that "at least until the late
nineteenth century the corporation was considered a public entity, in that it arose from a
concession by the state"); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personificationof the Business
Corporationin A,nerican Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1443-44 (1987) (noting that "[u]ntil
nearly the end of the nineteenth century business was generally conducted by single
proprietorships or partnerships rather than corporations" and that the "challenge that
private corporations posed to the sovereignty of the state ... was not fully apparent until
about the 1880s because, before that time, the vast majority of corporations were affairs
limited in scope and capacity").
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under the nation-states that were seen to create them may have been
generally accurate, though even relatively early in the twentieth century
concerns began to arise about the possibility of corporate "war
24
merchants" influencing national politics in a belligerent direction.
Historical evidence also suggests that wars have sometimes been fought
for "a minority of financial and industrial interests" that may reap "great
profit" as a result, even though overall national interests are rarely
advanced by aggressive war. 25 In general terms, the problem of war in
the days of Clausewitz, and perhaps through most of the twentieth
as a problem of "the state
century, could be conceived adequately
26
system" of international politics.
Today, however, business corporations can no longer be so easily
compartmentalized, and neither can the problem of modern war.
and
act internationally
Increasingly, business corporations
transnationally, citizens of the world rather than any particular nationstate. 27 In about twenty years, from 1969 to 1990, the number of
multinational firms more than tripled, from seven thousand to twentyfour thousand.2 8 By 2000, the number of multinational firms had more
than doubled again to sixty thousand, with 800,000 foreign
subsidiaries.2 9 Multinational business now accounts for approximately
one-quarter of world economic output. 30 Sales of multinational-affiliated
corporations are twice the value of global exports of all goods and

24.

See, e.g., ANTHONY SAMPSON, ARMS BAZAAR: FROM LEBANON TO LOCKHEED

(1977) (providing an overview of the international arms trade). The fear of corporate
See, e.g.,
influence on policy favoring war profits is still palpable today.
http://www.moveon.org/warprofiteering (last visited Oct. 31, 2001) (lobbying against
alternative corporate tax change on this ground).
WALTZ, supra note 8, at 145 (citing John Hobson's historical study of the Boer
25.
War, but criticizing the thesis of "imperialism" as a general cause of war). Some wars may
well result when "certain well-organized business interests are able to outweigh the weak,
diffused interest[s]" in a country, but such wars of "imperialism" are "an especially
expensive form of folly" for "the nation as a whole." Id. at 145-46 (citing and quoting
Hobson).
26.
Id. at ix. Some scholars, however, have argued that capitalist state formation
may encourage war. For a collection of anthropological essays along these lines, see
DEADLY DEVELOPMENTS: CAPITALISM, STATES AND WAR (S.P. Reyna & R.E. Downs eds.,

1999).
For an overview setting up the general problem, see Eric W. Orts, The
27.
Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 247-79
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); see also PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL
CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE LAW: THE SEARCH FORA NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993)

(describing the difficulty that globalization poses for traditional legal conceptions of the
business corporation).
Eric W. Orts, The Future of EnterpriseOrganization,96 MICH. L. REV. 1947,
28.
1963-64 (1998).
Stephen J. Kobrin, The End of Globalization? 6 (unpublished manuscript, on
29.
file with author) (citing UN statistics).
30.
Id.

556

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:549

services. 31
Although the number of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions fell by about fifty percent in 2001, especially after the events
of September 11, the slowdown followed a three-year surge in
international combinations, and the trend toward global companies is
likely to resume. 32 Two U.S.-based companies exemplify this changing
reality of global corporate governance. General Electric today classifies
more than thirty-five percent of its assets as foreign-up from only 13.5
percent in 1994-and IBM now has more than half of its total assets
located overseas. 33 The recent German-U.S. hybrid, DaimlerChrysler,
also illustrates this trend in its recent advertising campaign featuring a
single flag sewing together a group of smaller national flags and
boasting that the company calls over two hundred different countries
"home." 34 As a result, the concept of global "corporate citizenship" has
entered the business lexicon, even if the contours of this idea are not yet
35
clearly determined.
Many large multinational corporations have indeed become much
larger, in terms of overall economic wealth and political influence, than
some nation-states. Although comparing the economic size and political
muscle of business corporations with nation-states is to compare apples
with oranges, one can nevertheless observe in general terms that the
relative size and influence of business corporations have increased
dramatically in recent years compared with nation-states. According to
one recent study, fifty-one of the one hundred largest integrated
economic entities in the world today are business corporations; the
remaining forty-nine entities are nation-states.3 6 More than twenty

31.
Id.
For additional empirical evidence of the "importance and recent
acceleration of corporate globalization," see Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporationin Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 14-21 (1999).
32.
Joseph Quinlan, No Stopping the Global M&A Train, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2001, at 24.

33.
34.
35.

Id.
http://www.daimlerchrysler.de/index-e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
For recent treatments in the business literature, see CORPORATE GLOBAL

CITIZENSHIP: DOING BUSINESS IN THE PUBLIC EYE (Noel M. Tichy et al. eds., 1998);
MALCOLM MCINTOSH ET AL., CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONSIBLE COMPANIES (1998).
36.
NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND

THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY (2002) (forthcoming). See also John Kay, Choice as Control:
CorporationsHave Power in our Society, as Does Posh Spice. Is it a Cause for Concern?
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2001, available at http://www.johnkay.com/articles (critically
reviewing Hertz's claim). As indicated in the text, this comparison should be used with
caution because the metrics to determine the relative sizes of companies and countries are
different. For an incisive critique of the claim that business corporations have become
economically larger than nation-states, see Martin Wolf, Countries Still Rule the World,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at 13. Even when the mistaken methodology is corrected,
however, it remains true that in terms of a "value added" measurement, fourteen of the
world's largest one hundred economies are corporations rather than countries. Id. The
economic and political influence of large business corporations is significant.
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years ago, another observer argued that "the largest corporations
overshadow all save about a dozen of the nation-states of the planet" in
terms of "totality of assets.13 7 In terms of raw measurements of
economic size and power, large corporations are equal to some of the
smaller nation-states.3 8 As a result, "significant decisions affecting
people everywhere" are increasingly "made by corporate managers, not
political officers. '39 A large "void" with respect to business corporations
has therefore opened "at the intersection of national boundaries that is
'40
very difficult to manage and control.
Descriptively, then, we may criticize Clausewitz's view of the world
as too simple and old-fashioned. Economic, political, and cultural forces
of globalization have created what Juirgen Habermas calls a "new
postnational constellation. '41 Here, globalization means "a process" that
"characterizes the increasing scope and intensity of commercial,
'42
communicative, and exchange relations beyond national borders.
Expanding networks of "satellite technology, air travel, and digitalized
communication" characterize this process. 43 One might even say that
globalization has become "a condition-a globality, a world economy in
which the traditional and familiar boundaries are being surmounted or
made irrelevant."44 As described by Selya Benhabib, "global integration
in the sphere of economics, armament, finance, communication,
information, and tourism [has] proceeded with a dizzying pace. '45 New

37.

ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE 233 (1976).

38.
In 1999, for example, twenty-two U.S.-based corporations had a total market
capitalization larger than the gross domestic products of twenty-two nation-states.
Gretchen Morgenstern, A Company Worth More than Spain?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, §
3, at 1 (cited in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S
NEWEST EXPORT 2 (2001)). Again, these kinds of gross comparisons using different
measurements must be employed with caution. See supra note 36. Market capitalization
of a corporation means the value of the corporation's total assets determined as a function
of the price of its public securities, while the GDP of a nation-state includes contributions
of its own business corporations. Nevertheless, the overall relative comparison is useful to
give a ballpark conception of relative influence on a global scale.
39.
MILLER, supra note 37, at 233.
40.
Bradley, supra note 31, at 31.
41.
See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL
ESSAYS 60-61 (Max Pensky trans., 2001); see also MARTIN L. VAN CREVELD, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF THE STATE 336-421(1999) (describing the "decline of the state" in recent years
and the need to confront a new political reality "beyond the state").
42.
HABERMAS, supra note 41, at 65-66.
43.
Id. at 66.
44.
DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE
BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN
WORLD 14 (1998). Little of substance seems to turn on a distinction between globalization
as a "process" or "condition." For two excellent collections of essays on the phenomenon,
see GLOBAL CAPITALISM (Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 2000) and GOVERNANCE IN
A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
45.
Selya Benhabib, Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing
World 5 (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (forthcoming in POLITICAL SCIENCE:
THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE (Ira Katznelson & Helen Milner eds., 2002)).
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risks come with this process of globalization, including not only the
advent of new and potent brands of international terrorism, but also
global ecological challenges, global financial risks, and other collective
46
action problems for social organization.
Mark Duffield describes these emerging patterns as "paradoxes of
globalization. '47 The "changing competence of the nation-state,"
according to Duffield, results in "a shift" from a reliance on hierarchical
national governments to "wider and more polyarchal networks, contracts
and partnerships of governance." 48 Globalization raises problems of
political accountability and democratic legitimacy. 49 Considerations of
economics become elevated over politics in many areas.50 In addition,
globalization seems to occur in tandem with an increase in "cultural,
ethnic, linguistic, [and] religious separatisms and demands for local and
51
regional autonomy."
Globalization thus transforms the nature of war.5 2 According to
Martin van Creveld, the post-Westphalian period of the dominance of
nation-states and the paradigm of war as primarily involving conflict
among nation-states is now ending. 53 In van Creveld's words:
The state, which since the middle of the seventeenth century has been the
most important and most characteristic of all modern institutions, is in
decline. From Western Europe to Africa, many existing states are either
combining into larger communities or falling apart.... Globally speaking,
the international system is moving away from an assembly of distinct,
territorial, sovereign, legally equal states toward different, more
hierarchical, and in many ways more complicated structures. As far as
individual states are concerned, there are good reasons to think that many
of them will soon no longer be either willing or able to control and protect
the political, military, economic, social, and cultural lives of their citizens
to the extent that they used to. Needless to say, these developments affect
each and every individual now living on this planet. In some places, these
will proceed peacefully, but in others they are likely to result in-indeed
are already leading to-upheavals as profound, and possible as bloody, as

Id. See also Ulrich Beck, Globalization'sChernobyl, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001,
46.
at 15 (surveying the global risks that the events of September 11 exposed).
47.
Mark Duffield, Geography and the Boundariesof Confidence: Globalizationand
War Economies:PromotingOrder or the Return of History?, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
21, 21 (Fail 1999).
48.
Id. at 23.

49.

Id.

Id. For a description and analysis of the recent "shift" in emphasis from
50.
political states to economic markets, see YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 44, at 11-17,
125-51, 369-91.
51.
Benhabib, supra note 45, at 5.
For a leading recent treatment of this topic, see MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE
52.
TRANSFORMATION OF WAR (1991); see also ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY:
SHATTERING THE DREAMS OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 43-49 (2000) (discussing van
Creveld's theory of war and its influence on the Pentagon's thinking about war in the
twenty-first century).
53.
See KAPLAN, supra note 52, at 46 (describing van Creveld's views).
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those that propelled humanity out of the Middle Ages and into the modern
54
world.

In a globalized society, simplified versions of Clausewitz no longer apply.
Instead, nation-states are losing their grip on their monopolies of
violence. Global society may be returning to a world characterized by
complex struggles in which "political, social, economic, and religious
motives" become "hopelessly entangled. '55 If so, then we may well
expect the return to prominence of "mercenaries" and "swarms of private
armies" such as those that characterized the period of the Reformation
56
and the Thirty Years' War in Europe.
Perhaps the leading contemporary theorist of war, John Keegan,
agrees with the premises of this diagnosis. According to Keegan, war
has become too expensive for modern rich states to wage against each
other in its "full potentiality," but it has also "become, paradoxically, a
cheap and deadly undertaking for poor states, for enemies of the state
idea, and for factions in states falling apart. '57 Rather than states, we
therefore face new kinds of enemies. 58 "The rogue ruler, the terrorist
and the fundamentalist movement, the ethnic or religious faction,"
Keegan writes, "are all enemies as serious as any, in an age of junk
weapons, as civili[z]ation has ever faced."5 9 If anyone doubted Keegan's
forecast, the events of September 11 must surely have convinced them
otherwise. New technologies and political challenges have significantly
changed the nature of war in a modern, globalized world. In this new
world of more constant threats, limited rather than total war becomes
the rule, rather than the exception. 60 As General Wesley Clark writes,
military actions in this "difficult region" are "not quite war, not quite
6
peace." 1
At the same time that Keegan recognizes technological and political
changes in the nature of modern war, however, he criticizes Clausewitz's
traditional conception on normative grounds. 62 Keegan sees Clausewitz
as producing "the most pernicious philosophy" of war "yet conceived"
because Clausewitz views war as "a value free activity, outside the moral
sphere." 63 The history of the catastrophes of the "short" twentieth

54.

VAN CREVELD, supra note 41, at vii.

55.
56.

KAPLAN, supra note 52, at 46 (quoting van Creveld).
Id.

57.

JOHN KEEGAN, WAR AND OUR WORLD 68 (1998).

Id.
58.
Id.
59.
WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KoSOVO, AND THE FUTURE
60.
OF COMBAT 418-19 (2001) (describing NATO's intervention in Serbia and Kosovo as a
"limited war" of a kind likely to be repeated in the future).
61.
Id. at 458. In this middling region between unlimited war and international
criminal police actions, Clark includes unlimited war, pre- and post-conflict operations,
and "nation building." Id.
62.
KEEGAN, supra note 57, at 41-43.
Id. at 41-42.
63.
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century and its two global wars provide graphic evidence that
Clausewitz was mistaken in thinking that the "rational" calculations of
64
national interests by states would limit warfare.
Important implications for a contemporary moral perspective on
65
war follow from its new globalized character. War changes over time.
"Like a disease," again according to Keegan, "it exhibits the capacity to
mutate, and mutates fastest in the fact of efforts to control or eliminate
66
it."1
Keegan defines war broadly as "collective killing for some collective
purpose." 67 It retains "a scourge-like nature . . . to threaten the very
'68
survival of civilization itself.
From the perspective of the business corporation, this account of the
modern, globalized nature of war suggests several important issues.
First, business corporations have increasingly become "detached" from
nation-states in their everyday operations. The driving force of .this

process of globalization is fundamentally economic rather than
political. 6 9 "Nation-states do not trade with one another," as two
commentators argued recently, "enterprises do." 70 Because business
corporations are fundamental to the globalization process, they are also
key to understanding the changed nature of the disease of modern war
and its possible antidotes.
Second, the central role of business enterprises in globalization
means that they cannot avoid becoming implicated in global issues of

64.
For Keegan, Clausewitz's theory therefore at least implicitly provided a
justification for the totalitarian state. Id. at 42. For an account of "the short twentieth
century" as including the "catastrophe" of two world wars, see HABERMAS, supra note 41,
at 37-57. See also Eric Hobsbawm, War and Peace in the 20th Century, LONDON REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 21, 2002, at 16 (observing that the twentieth century, taken as "having begun
in 1914," was "the most murderous in recorded history" and "a century of almost unbroken
war, with few and brief periods without organized armed conflict somewhere"). As Waltz
argues, Rousseau had, prior to Clausewitz, made a convincing theoretical case that nationstates acting in their own self-interests--even as aggregated in a "general will"-have
inadequate incentives to maintain peace. WALTZ, supra note 8, at 165-86 (critically
discussing Rousseau's theory).
See KEEGAN, supranote 57, at 72 ("War is a protean activity, by which I mean
65.
it changes form, often unpredictably ....
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 1.
69.
See supra notes 41-45, 50 and accompanying text. An adequate historical
description of the rise of semi-autonomous corporations would include political and
especially legal dimensions. But a full historical description of what may be called in
sociological terms the "differentiation" of economic enterprises from political society
remains beyond the scope of this Article. For some references to this process, however, see
supra note 23.
Michael A. Almond & Scott. D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption,
70.
CorporateResponsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 389, 402 (1997). This view is somewhat overstated because nationstates set the rules for trade between and among internationally organized enterprises.
But the basic point is correct given an underlying political and legal infrastructure that
supports international commerce.

20021

WAR AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION

war and peace. If not to the same extent as the nation-states that field
great armies, business corporations often have occasion to ally with
states in using force and even hire military help independently of states.
If nation-states cannot protect business interests, then businesses will
find other ways to protect themselves. An example is found in
contemporary Russia, where hiring a private security agency and even
paying organized crime for protection are counted as the normal course
of doing business. 71 Indeed, the rise of private security companies in the
world at large is an immense growth industry, which seems to illustrate
states and an increase
both a decline of the protective powers of political
72
in business responses to social insecurity.
Third, the decline of the relative influence of nation-states means
that the "new enemies" of international society, including terrorists, as
well as organized crime, may use corporate and other business
organizational forms for illicit ends. 73 A chilling recent example is the
"corporate" organization of the Al Qaeda terrorist network. 74
International channels and methods of business may be employed for
illicit political and economic purposes, and new organizational responses
to these threats are required.
Fourth, the nature of modern war highlights the fact that business
corporations are not only abstract economic entities but social
institutions. As organized institutions composed of human beings, they
have moral and political as well as economic responsibilities. Like
states, business corporations must therefore develop their own foreign
and domestic policies, either implicitly and unconsciously or, much
better, explicitly and with awareness. This does not mean that large,
global corporations should appoint new vice presidents of war or defense,

Executives at Phillip Morris, for example, admit that men armed with
71.
Kalashnikovs must accompany shipments of cigarettes from Moscow to other parts of
Russia. CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, Note, MarsBars and Marlboros:Cultural Aspects of
Foreign Investment in Russia, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 525 (1997).
According to one recent estimate, half of all new businesses in Russia reported that they
paid some form of protection money to organized crime. Id. at 502. See also Scott D.
Syfert, Capitalism or Corruption? Corporate Structure, Western Investment and
Commercial Crime in the Russian Federation,18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357
(1999) (describing the massive problems of business crime and corruption in contemporary
Russia and how foreign investors deal with them).
72.
For statistics on the exponential growth of the private security business in
Europe and the United States, see VAN CREVELD, supranote 41, at 404. See also infra text
accompanying notes 90-102 (discussing the rise of "private military companies").
See, e.g., Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10
73.
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2000) (describing the general phenomenon of the increasing
use of global organizations for criminal and terrorist ends). See also JOHN KERRY, THE
NEW WAR: THE WEB OF CRIME THAT THREATENS AMERICA'S SECURITY 16-19 (1997)

(describing new network of international criminal organizations that "function like
transnational corporations" and employ methods of modern global business enterprise).
See Kurt Eichenwald, TerrorMoney Hardto Block, Officials Find, N.Y. TIMES,
74.
Dec. 10, 2001, at Al; Don Van Natta, Jr., Running Terrorismas a New Economy Business,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at 5.
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but it does require corporate leaders to take the larger global issues of
war and peace seriously from a moral as well as an economic
perspective. In a "postnational" world, business corporations can no
longer simply rely on nation-states to take care of problems of
international security, if, indeed, they ever could delegate this
responsibility entirely.

II. ON THE NATURE OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
Milton Friedman has memorably expressed one common
understanding of the nature and purposes of the modern business
corporation. In general, according to Friedman, corporate executives
have the responsibility "to make as much money as possible while
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law
and those embodied in ethical custom. '75 Unpacking this approach into
a more formal analytical framework, the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance states that the "objective" of a
corporation is "the conduct of business activities with a view to
enhancing corporate profits and shareholder gain," though legal and
ethical considerations qualify this economic objective. 76 Specifically,
there are at least three qualifications. First, even if economic objective is
not "enhanced," corporations are "obliged, to the same extent as a
natural person, to act within the boundaries of the law. '77 Second,
corporations "[m]ay take into account ethical obligations that are
reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business." 78 And third, corporations may "devote a reasonable amount of
resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and

75.

Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its

Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
76.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994). Although intended to be "consistent with case law,"
§ 2.01 has "sparked controversy" among commentators. Bradley et al., supranote 31, at
48. As my colleague, Alan Strudler, emphasized in discussions with me, the ALI's
restatement of the corporate objective as "enhancing corporate profits and shareholder
gain" is not synonymous with Friedman's injunction "to make the most money possible."
The latter seems to lead to an imperative of "shareholder value maximization," while the
softer verb "enhance" seems to allow for non-maximizing value strategies-including profit
"satisficing"-and perhaps even the addition of multiple objectives, including what the ALI
formally structures as exceptions to the economic objective, namely, socially responsible
objectives of following the law and acting ethically. The ALI's "enhancing corporate profits
and shareholder gain" language is probably best interpreted as a compromise between
contending views of the business corporation in society. If correct, this interpretation
would provide further evidence that the "end of history" in corporate law has not been
reached. Academic debates can and should continue about the proper place of corporate
governance within the larger society.
77.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b)(1).
78.
Id. § 2.01(b)(2).
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philanthropic purposes." 79 Modern war raises concerns on all three
levels related to the corporate objective: economic, legal, and ethical.80

A. War and the Economic Objective
On the purely economic dimension, private corporations may seek to
make profits and enhance shareholder value by engaging in the business
of war, that is, manufacturing and selling weapons, munitions, and
military services. Recent activities in this industry give a sense of the
scale of the business.
On October 27, 2001, the U.S. Defense
Department awarded the largest military contract in U.S. history to
Lockheed Martin Corporation in the amount of $200 billion for the
building of a new Joint Strike Fighter supersonic stealth jet.81 Recent
acquisitions by U.S.-based Northrop Grumman Corporation give an
indication of the increasing size of defense-related corporations. In 2001,
this company acquired, among other purchases, Litton Industries for
$5.1 billion and Newport News Shipbuilding for $2.6 billion.8 2 In
February 2002, Northrop Grumman offered $5.9 billion for TRW Corp.
and subsequently announced a hostile takeover bid in approximately the
same amount.83 News of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon sent military stocks upward.8 4 Similar, though
perhaps smaller, connections between business corporations and
national military budgets apply to both companies and countries outside
the United States.8 5 Clearly, there is much money still to be made in

79.
Id. § 2.01(b)(3).
80.
Although my analysis in this part will draw primarily on U.S. examples, the
general issues are relevant also for law and business corporations in other countries with
appropriate amendments.
81.
Edward Alden, Lockheed Wins $200bn US Fighter Project, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
27/28, 2001, at 1; James Dao & Laura M. Holson, Lockheed Wins $200 Billion Deal for
FighterJet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at Al. The loser was Boeing Corporation. See also
Alexander Nicole, Aerospace Companies.Scramble in Their Biggest Dogfight Yet, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at 8.
82.
MilitaryIntelligence:Northrop Grumman Sets Its Sights on TRW's High-tech
Jewels, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2002, at 62.
83.
Laura M. Holson, Northrop Grumman Bids $5.9 Billion for TRW, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2002, at BI; MilitaryIntelligence, supra note 82. At this writing, the outcome of
the Northrop Grumman and TRW contest had not yet been decided.
84.
JAMES DAO, Beneficiariesof Military Buildup Await Their Orders,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2001, at Cl (noting, for example, double-digit percentage gains in the stock prices
of General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon).
85.
The United States leads the world by a large margin in military spending. In
February 2002, President Bush proposed a fourteen percent increase in the defense
budget. Dana Milbank & Bradley Graham, Bush Calls Defense Top Budget Priority;
Proposed 14 Percent Hike Is Largest Since Reagan Era,WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2002, at A7.
This would yield an increase of forty-eight billion dollars, and this additional amount alone
would be more than either the combined total military budgets of France and Britain or
the combined budgets of the other twelve NATO members. Richard Norton-Taylor, Top
Gun--and the Rest: The Gap Between US Military Capability and that of the Rest of the
World Is Now So Big that It Raises Serious Questions about the TransatlanticAlliance,
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war, and today business corporations act as the primary vehicles for the
purpose.
Special issues of law and ethics arise in military contracting.
Billion dollar contracts must create great temptations for corporate
executives or other employees to fudge the rules on political lobbying and
fair economic competition. The regulation"of government procurement
contracts has therefore been traditionally very detailed. 86 In the United
States, a large Defense Contract Auditing Agency oversees defense
procurement.8 7 Companies themselves recognize the special nature of
the legal and ethical problems they face, and-the defense industry in the
United States has organized a voluntary Defense Industry Initiative on
Business Ethics and Conduct. 88
Another important issue involves the regulation of financial
contributions to political campaigns.8 9 Although it is not illegal for
business corporations to contribute to the political process, the question
arises whether a military contractor should, as a matter of policy, have
significant influence in choosing political leaders. At least arguably, the
economic objective should not allow corporations in the business of war
to support candidates with particularly aggressive foreign policy
agendas.

GUARDIAN, Feb. 13, 2002, at 19. Even before the post-September 11 increase, the total
annual U.S. military budget exceeded the combined annual defense budgets of all other
NATO countries as well as Russia and China! Id. Even so, military spending by other
countries is not paltry. China, for example, recently announced that it also would increase
its military spending by more than seventeen percent to about twenty billion dollars next
year, though some experts consider this official figure to be low. Erik Ekholm, China Is
IncreasingIts Budget ForMilitary Spending by 17.6%, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at A13.
Much Chinese military spending will go to government-organized military companies. To
give a few other examples, Germany's defense budget in 2002 of twenty-two billion dollars
is approximately of the same order of magnitude as China's. Victor Homola, Germany:
MilitaryFunds To Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at A6. Even Canada, which one
would think relatively safe, spends more than eleven billion dollars on defense and expects
to increase this amount. David Gamble, Defence Budget Hike; Feds Expected to Give
Forces $1.2b Boost, TORONTO SUN, Dec. 9, 2001, at 10.
86.
For a good overview of the regulation of the federal government procurement
contracting process, with criticism of Clinton administration reforms, see Steven L.
Schooner, Fearof Oversight: The FundamentalFailureof Businesslike Government, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 627 (2001).
87.
See http://www.dcaa.mil (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
88.
See http://www.dii.org (last visited Dec. 14, 2001). The Defense Industry
Initiative includes "a set of six principles drafted by the representatives from eighteen
defense contractors that called for specific compliance procedures, policies, and programs,
e.g., codes of ethics, ethics training, and internal reporting practices." William S. Laufer,
CorporateLiability,Risk Shifting, and the Paradoxof Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343,
1348 (1999).
89.
For general treatments of the jurisprudence of regulation of corporate
campaign contributions, which involves First Amendment restrictions, see Jill E. Fisch,
Frankenstein'sMonster Hits the Campaign Trail, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587 (1991);
Thomas J. Woo, The Modern Corporationand CampaignFinance:IncorporatingCorporate
Governance into First Amendment Jurisprudence,79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2001).
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Before going on to consider other legal and ethical constraints on
the economic objective of business corporations, it is worth devoting
some attention to one particularly troubling trend that raises the
question of whether some business corporations should be banned from
engaging in military profit-making. This trend relates to the recent
increase in what have been called "private military companies"
(PMCs). 90
In June 1997, the Pentagon held a conference on the "privatization
of security" in sub-Saharan Africa. 91 Members of a new growth industry
of PMCs were on display, as well as the private security representatives
of some large oil companies, such as Texaco and Exxon. 92 For example,
Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) claims "the greatest
corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world," including
seventeen retired U.S. generals and hundreds of former U.S. Special
Forces personnel. 93 Vinnell Corporation is another example. It employs
approximately one thousand former U.S. military personnel in training
sixty-five thousand members of the Saudi National Guard, the personal
94
Executive
security contingent protecting the Saudi Royal family.
Outcomes (EO) was a South African company that supplied combat
95
soldiers in sub-Saharan Africa until it closed for business in 1999.
EO's air capabilities included a fleet of helicopters and MIG fighter
96
jets.
The existence and use of PMCs raises a central question with
respect to the economic objective of corporate law. Unlike informal or ad
hoc networks of mercenary armies in the past, PMCs today have
developed a "distinct corporate nature," including "a desire for good
public relations." 97 Should these new corporate "soldiers of fortune" be
accepted as just another way of doing business? At least, the issue of the

Craig Forcese, Deterring"MilitarizedCoin merce": The Prospectof Liability/or
90.
"Privatized"Human Rights Abuses, 31 OTrAWA L. REV. 171, 174 (1999/2000). See also
David Shearer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN POL'Y, at 68 (Fall 1998) (describing the rise of
private military companies).
Forcese, supra note 90, at 174.
91.
Id. Not surprisingly, the private security business has been a growth industry
92.
in the post-September 11 world. See Al Baker, FearFeeds Bull Market in PrivateSecurity,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at Dl. A distinction should be drawn, however, between private
security firms operating within the legal framework of a nation-state and military firms
with transnational scope.
Howe, supra note 12, at 2. See also Matthew J. Gaul, Note & Comment,
93.
Regulating the New Privateers: Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern
Marqueand Reprisal Clause, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1489, 1493-96 (1998) (describing MPRI).
Id. Vinnell is a subsidiary of TRW Corporation based in Fairfax, Virginia. See
94.
http://www.vinnell.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2001). See also Gaul, supra note 93, at 149699 (1998) (describing Vinnell).
Bonile Ngqiyaza, Mercenaries a Global Growth Industry: Former Apartheid
95.
MilitaryMen Are in GreatDemand, BUS. DAY (South Africa), June 30, 2000, at 2 (available
on Lexis/Nexis).
Howe, supra note 12, at 2.
96.
Id.
97.
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intrinsic legitimacy of these kinds of businesses arises. A primary aspect
of the claim to legitimacy by political states involves the assumed
Private military
monopoly on military force that they exercise.
force. The
coercive
companies threaten to erode this monopoly of
compare
not
value
does
economic objective of maximizing shareholder
basis for
a
legitimate
favorably with theories of political democracy as
for
therefore,
can
be
made,
the use of military force. A good argument
of
forces
an international agreement to ban PMCs, though the social
At
the
to
achieve.
globalization may make such an agreement difficult
same time, it is accurate to observe that the rise of PMCs responds to
"the pullback of western nations and the United Nations from
peacekeeping and peace enforcing" missions, especially in poor or
developing countries. 98 At least, the international community should
seek to regulate the actions and behavior of PMCs, probably through an
international treaty, in other words, through the development of morally
informed legal constraints.9 9 Already in the United States, for example,
some regulation is provided under the Arms Export Control Act and the
Export Administration Act.10 0 The Arms Export Control Act provides
conditions for the foreign sale of U.S. military equipment or services, and
the Export Administration Act regulates the export and sale of so-called
10 1
"dual-use" material that has both civilian and military applications.
Other countries regulate PMCs more directly, such as under the
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act adopted in South Africa in
1998.102 But effective international regulation of private companies
engaged in the actual provision of military services as "modern
0 3
mercenaries" is lacking, if not entirely absent.1

98.

Id. at 5.

Id. at 7. See also Kevin O'Brien, Leash the Dogs of War, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20,
99.
2002, at 15 (arguing that private military companies require "effective regulation, at both
the national and international levels").
Howe, supra note 12, at 7.
100.
Id. n.18; Jonathan T. Stoel, Note, Codes of Conduct on Armns Transfers-The
101.
Movement Toward a MultilateralApproach, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1285, 1292-93
(2000). For an overview of defense-related export control law, see also Berne C. Kluber,

Global Distributions:The Effect of Export Controls,23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 429 (2001); Jere
W. Morehead and David A. Dismuke, Export Control Policies and National Security:

Protecting U.S. Interests in the New Millennium, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173 (1999).
102.
O'Brien, supra note 99. The South African law "regulates both the existence of
the companies (by forcing them to be licensed even to operate) and their operations (by
making them seek licensed approval for each contract undertaken)." Id. There is also
some international effort to regulate mercenary activities, such as the International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries of
1989-which entered into force in 2001-but the vague definitions of mercenary activities
render these restrictions "virtually unenforceable." Id.
Id. The problem of regulating "privateers" is not, of course, new. See Gaul,
103.
supra note 93, at 1490, 1501-04 (1998) (describing "private military service contractors" as
"modern day privateers" and giving historical background dating to the American
Revolution). But the flexibility and global transportability of the corporate form add
complexity to the problem.
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B. Legal Constraintson the Business of War
Contrary to what one might assume from a strict shareholders-only
view of the business corporation, the accepted general rule in the United
States is that a corporation has an obligation to follow the law, in the
words of the American Law Institute, "to the same extent as a natural
person." 10 4 The Reporters' comments on this requirement make clear
that "cost-benefit analysis," though it may have an appropriate role in
government determinations about the adoption of legal rules, should not
10 5
apply to a corporation's own decisions whether to comply with the law.
Because "the resulting legal rule normally represents a community
decision that the conduct is wrongful as such," then "cost-benefit
10 6
analysis whether to obey the rule is out of place."
This requirement to follow the law even if it is not economically
convenient to do so is .mandatory, in contrast to the permissively
formulated ethical and philanthropic qualifications. 0 7 The Principlesof
CorporateGovernance recognize, however, that the requirement to follow
the law finds its own justification in the "moral norm of obedience to
law."10 8 The legitimacy of this norm derives in turn from the legitimacy
of democratic governments that enact the law.' 09 As Melvin Eisenberg,
a Reporter for the American Law Institute's Principles,explains: "Ours
is a society of law. We don't want a society in which [the] major
110
players-that is, corporations-are lawless."
Several complications with what Eisenberg calls this "legal-conduct
principle" arise in practice."' First, in a globalized world, corporations
will often find themselves subject to inconsistent regulations. 112 One
may say, as Lockheed Martin does in its Code of Ethics and Business
Conduct, that a corporation will "obey all the laws of the countries in

104.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b)(1).
105.
Id. § 2.01(b)(1) cmt. g.
106.
Id.
107.
A commentator on early drafts of § 2.01 made the point that it "consists of a
mixture of mandates and aspirations."' Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate
Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALl's Principles,52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 511, 512 (1984). The
obligation to the follow the law is expressed as a "mandate," while the ethical and
philanthropic provisions are "permissive." Id.
108.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b)(1) cmt. g.
109.
The legitimacy of law is a large and complex jurisprudential topic. For one of
my attempts to grapple with the issue, see Eric W. Orts, Systemic Legitimacy and Positive
Law: A Comment on Hartand Habermas, 6 RATIO JURIS 245 (1993). At least arguably, law
may claim some degree of legitimacy even in undemocratic nation-states. For a normative
argument along these lines in the case of contemporary China, see Eric W. Orts, The Rule
of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001).
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct that Does Not Maximize
110.
Shareholder Gain, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).

111.
112.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
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which we do business. 11 3 This promise, however, does not account for
hard choices that need to be made when laws of different countries
conflict. In the case of a major government contractor like Lockheed
Martin, one assumes that loyalty to its "home country" of the United
States outweighs conflicting laws of other countries, but this choice
requires a moral judgment. 114 It is not merely a technical question of
conflicts of laws.
Second, even with respect to following one set of national laws,
complex regulations may mean that it is practically impossible to comply
with all regulations all of the time. 115 One example comes from
environmental law, in which corporate compliance officers find keeping
abreast of changing regulations difficult and full compliance with them
impossible." 6 The same difficulty may arise in the complex legal
environment of military contracting. To take Lockheed Martin again as
an example, the corporation recognizes that "laws and regulations
related to government contracting are far-reaching and complex, thus
placing responsibilities on Lockheed Martin beyond those faced by
companies without government customers," but the company
nevertheless promises to "conduct our business in accordance with all
applicable laws and regulations."' 7 Complying with potentially
conflicting regulations in different countries also complicates these
problems. In Lockheed's recently awarded contract for the Joint Strike
Fighter, the company will have to comply with both U.S. and U.K.
laws. l l8
Third, the question of obeying the law "to the same extent as a
natural person" raises the question of the scope of the comparative
standard. 119 If most "natural persons" disobey the law-speed limits on
highways, for example-then may corporate decision makers follow the
same strategy? 20 Many examples in this category are trivial, but

113.

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/exeth/html/code/print.html (last visited Oct.

29, 2001).
At the time of this writing, Lockheed Martin's homepage included a link to a
114.
series of patriotic video tributes as well as the announcement of a new Lockheed Martin
American Spirit Fund to provide charitable contributions for relief to New York,
See
Washington, and other regions affected by the September 11 attacks.
http://www.lockheedmartin.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2001). The site leaves no doubt about
the company's national loyalty.
115.
See generally Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 3-6 (discussing corporations'
differing goals and obligations).
116.
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive EnvironmentalLaw, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1240-41 &
n.55 (1995) (surveys show most participants do not believe that full compliance with all
environmental laws was even possible).
117.
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/exeth/html/code/print.html (last visited Oct.
29, 2001).
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
118.
119.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b)(1), cmt. g.
120.
For a hypothetical along these lines involving setting corporate policy to
comply-or violate-different state limits for the weight of trucks traveling on highways,
see WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 349-50 (4th ed. 2000).
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''natural persons" certainly often take risks in not following the law,
accepting the risks that if they get caught, they will pay the fine or
penalty. 121 Arguably at least, business corporations should enjoy a
22
similar freedom of action.1
Lastly, the moral obligation to obey the law does not always trump
other more basic moral obligations. 123 The topic of potential conflicts
124
between the obligations of law and morality is a very large one.
Suffice it to say here that a corporation engaged in the business of war
may sometimes face serious moral considerations that require
abstention from following a law or even affirmative civil disobedience of
an unjust law or a tyrannical government. 1 5 To take one example,
corporations doing business within Nazi Germany cannot claim simply
to have been "following the law" to justify war profits. 126 Similarly,

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b)(1), cmt. g. See generally
121.
KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 47-53 (1987) (discussing reasons
people obey the law).
On the other hand, one can argue that corporate policies to disobey the law122.
even for a presumably trivial reason like speeding or parking tickets-should be treated
more severely because of the organizational and deliberate nature of a decision about
policy, rather than seat-of-the-pants decisions by natural persons to comply or not to
comply with traffic laws. Encouraging one's employees to break traffic laws, in other
words, is worse than breaking them yourself or dealing with the consequences of your
employees having decided to break the law on their own.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01 cmt. h; GREENAWALT, supra
123.
note 121, at 47-270.
For useful overviews of the basic issues, see GREENAWALT, supra note 121, at
124.
47-61; THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS (William A.
Edmundson ed., 1999).
125.
GREENAWALT, supra note 121, at 47-61. See generally AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01 cmt. g. (discussing reasons for not following a law).
Claims against firm that employed slave labor during the Nazi regime include
126.
not only prominent German corporations such as Bayer, BMW, Krupp, Siemens, and
Volkswagen, but also American firms with German subsidiaries such as Ford, General
Motors, Exxon-Mobil, and Kodak. See Kara C. Ryf, Note, Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG:
U.S. CourtsAllow Siemens and Degussato Profitfrom HolocaustSlave Labor, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 155, 156-58 (2001). See also John Christopher Anderson, Respecting
Human Rights: MultinationalCorporationsStrike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 469
(2000) (noting that Bayer has admitted to using slave labor during the Nazi period, while
BMW, Volkswagen, and Siemens have been accused of similar behavior); Stuart M.
Kreindler, Comment, History's Accounting: Liability Issues Surrounding German
Companies for the Use of Slave Labor by Their CorporateForefathers,18 DICK. J. INT'L L.
343-44 (2000) (discussing the circumstances of various lawsuits filed against German
companies in the United States; Kevin M. McDonald, Corporate Civil Liability Under the
U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act for Violations of Customary International Law During the
ThirdReich, 1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 167. In one recent case, a court
sustained a cause of action brought for Nazi-era crimes against a German subsidiary of
Ford. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D. N.J. 1999).
In the Nuremberg Trials, a showing of "necessity" under compulsion or duress was
allowed as a defense for some individual defendant businesses who employed slave labor to
further the economic interests of the Nazi regime. But this defense was not permitted to
defendants who had "embraced the opportunity" or expressed an "ardent desire" to employ
slave labor. Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1309-10 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing
three Nuremberg cases).
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corporations today must make judgments about the morality of doing
business with various nation-states and other actors for different
purposes. 127 Following the law is not a sufficient reason to act

immorally, and this principle applies even more strongly to fundamental
problems of war and peace than other circumstances in which the stakes
128
for human beings and their fundamental rights may be smaller.
Moral obligations to avoid complicity in unjust wars may also lead
to changing legal standards for liability. 2 9 Thus, for example, the
extension of liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act l3 0 and Torture
Victim Prevention Act 13 1 may reflect a general movement toward

increasing international enforcement of basic human rights. 132 Cases
have begun to recognize causes of action for the breach of internationally
recognized human rights-jus cogens-in the United States and
34
elsewhere. 133 For example, the leading case of Filartigau. Pena-Irala
held "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority" to
be actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act as a violation of
"universally accepted norms of international law of human rights.' 1 35
More recently, in Kadic v. Karadzic,136 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld a claim against a private citizen under the Alien
Tort Claims Act for a violation of international legal prohibitions against
war crimes and genocide.' 3 7 Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian-Serb, had
138
been served process when he visited the United Nations in New York.
He was accused of genocide, war crimes, and other human rights

127.
One interesting development has been the increasing tendency of political
subdivisions.of the nation-states-such as the "states" of the United States-to assert
political restrictions on business operations. For examples and an overview of the
constitutional issues involved, see Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State
Bargainingand the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1129-50 (2000).
128.
See GREENAWALT, supra note 121, at 47-53 (discussing reasons people disobey
the law).
129.
See DRINAN, supra note 13, at 100-03 (discussing potential liability for failure
to respect human rights).
130.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
131.
Id.
132.
DRINAN, supra note 13, at 95-103; Anderson, supra note 126, at 491-96. See

also Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudicatioi in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human
Rights at the CorporateLevel, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1139 (arguing for use of class actions to
enforce human rights violations by corporations abroad).
133.
For a discussion of the general problem, see Christopher A. Ford, Adjudicating
Jus Cogens, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145 (1994). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Customary
InternationalLaw and PrivateRights of Action, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 421 (2000) (arguing that
a "second wave" of post-Filartigaprivate human rights actions based on customary
international law have largely failed with respect to U.S. defendants). For a critique of the
development of universal legal principles such as jus cogens, see Alfred P. Rubin, Actio
Popularis,Jus Cogens, and Offenses Erga Omnnes?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265 (2001).
134.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
135.
Id. at 878.
136.
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
137.
Id. at 236.
138.
Id. at 237.
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violations committed against Croatian and Muslim citizens of BosniaHerzegovina. 1 39 The court upheld the action against a motion to dismiss
under the principles of Filartiga,finding with respect to the "state
action" requirement that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged Karadzic
to be acting either on behalf of an embryonic "state" or "in concert" with
Serbia-the former Yugoslavia. 140 The court also noted in dicta that the
U.S. Supreme Court had previously upheld claims against private
individuals under the Alien Tort Claims Act.141 Pirates, slave traders, or
other types of "hostis humani generis"-- enemies of all humankind142
have been held accountable for violations of international legal norms.
1 43
Doe v. Unocal Corporation
provides an example of how
extraterritorial liability for violations of international law may apply to
business corporations. In Unocal, the company and its officials were
sued under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of human rights in a
joint venture with a French oil company, Total N.A., in Myanmar
(Burma). 144 The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on
the ground that the official "state action" requirement of the Alien Tort
Claims Act had not been met. 145 The facts of the case, however, suggest
a close call. The U.S. State Department had warned Unocal of the use of
forced labor-otherwise known as slavery-by Myanmar. And the
Myanmar army which agreed to undertake a "security" role in the gas
pipeline project had a history of violations of human rights. 146 One of
Unocal's own consultants had even written a letter warning that
"egregious human rights violations have occurred, and are occurring

139.
Id. at 236. The allegations included "various atrocities, including brutal acts of
rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution, carried
out by Bosnian-Serb military forces as part of a genocidal campaign." Id. at 237. Karadzic
was alleged to have "ultimate command authority" over these military forces. Id.
140.
Id. at 244-45.
141.
Id. at 239 (citing early cases against piracy).
142.
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting In re The Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 213 (1844)). See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (arguing that individual
liability was available under the Alien Tort Claims Act for some acts including piracy and
slave trading). Pirates and their ilk, of course, are as old as human civilization. See, e.g.,
THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. 137 (Rex Warner trans., ed., 1972) (recounting
that Minos was "the first person to organize a navy" to combat "piracy," which had become
a common profession" in ancient Greece).
143.
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
144.
Id. at 1295. In a separated proceeding, Total was dismissed from the action on
grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
145.
Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-10. In its legal analysis, the court drew on
questionable comparisons to the "state action" requirements in federal civil rights cases.
Id. at 1305-07. The court does not explain why "state action" in the context of
international violations of human rights should be compared with "state action"
requirements in the enforcement of national civil rights. The "states" in question are quite
different.
146.
Id. at 1296-98, 1302. Unocal's CEO admitted understanding that the
Myanmar army would "provide general security" for the project, but denied any knowledge
of "any contract" to this effect. Id. at 1301.
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now, in southern Burma" including "forced relocation" and "forced
labor."'147 According to the consultant, "Unocal, by seeming to have
accepted [the Myanmar army's] version of events, appears at best naive
and at worst a willing partner in the situation." 148 Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, and Greenpeace confronted Unocal
executives about its complicity in the project and were ignored. 149 In the
end, the district court granted summary judgment under a strict reading
of the "state action" requirement of the Alien Tort Claims Act and
concluded that the plaintiffs had presented "no evidence that Unocal
'participated in or influenced' the military's unlawful conduct. '150 No
evidence revealed an explicit contract, agreement, or conspiracy between
Unocal and the Myanmar government to violate human rights through
forced labor and relocation.' 5 1 In reaching its result, the court discussed
the Nazi-era Nuremberg cases against German industrialists to apply
52
the relevant international legal principles.
At least, it appears from the facts found in the case that the Unocal
executives stepped over the moral, if not the legal, edge of acceptable
behavior by knowingly benefitting from human rights violations in the
pursuit of its economic objectives. 153
Although Doe v. Unocal
Corporationmay be narrowly interpreted as a corporate victory against
human rights claims, few business corporations would wish to have to
rely on Nazi-era precedents and good lawyering to win summary
judgment in similar circumstances. 1 54 If the case reached a jury, the
outcome would most likely be unpleasant for shareholders as well as
corporate executives. The holding of Doe v. Unocal Corporationis also
arguably in tension with the Second Circuit's recognition of the potential
liability of private citizens without a state action requirement in Kadic v.
Karadzic.155

147.
Id. at 1299-1300.
148.
Id. Unocal's counsel even argued that the forced "government services in lieu
of payment of taxes" could be justified under a post-Civil War precedent that upheld a
state's requirement "to work on roads and bridges for ten hours a day for six days per year
or pay $3 [in tax]." Id. at 1308 (citing Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916)). The court
rightly rejected this argument as "hardly analogous." Id.
149.
Id. at 1300-04.
150.
Id. at 1306.
151.
Id. at 1306-10.
152.
Id. at 1309-10. Three cases at Nuremberg involved prosecutions of German
industrialists for war crimes. Defendants convicted were two executives in the German
steel industry, five executives of the I.G. Farben chemicals company, and twelve member
of the Krupp corporation. Id. at 1309-10 (citing Nuremberg cases).
153.
Id. at 1304-10.
154.

Id. at 1309-10.

155.
Supra note 142 and accompanying text (noting private liability of hostis
humani generis for human rights violations under international law). For further
discussion of the Unocal case and its implications, see Craig Forcese, Note, ATCA's
Achilles Heel: CorporateComplicity, InternationalLaw and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26
YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 510-15 (2001); Greenfield, supra note 23, at 1285-87; Pia Zara
Thadhani, Note, Regulating CorporateHuman Rights Abuses: Is Unocal The Answer?, 42
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Another recent case confirms that the concerns raised in Doe v.
Unocal Corporation are not an aberration. In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Company,156 the district court upheld an action alleging
violations of international human rights involving activities of Royal
Dutch/Shell in Nigeria against a motion to dismiss.151 The plaintiffs
claimed that Shell Nigeria had recruited Nigerian police and military
personnel to repress political opposition to its development plans in the
Ogoni region of Nigeria. 158 Substantive allegations included beatings,
rapes, torture, and murder, including the well-known hanging of the
human rights activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa. 159 As in Unocal, the plaintiffs in
Wiwa brought their claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the
Torture Victim Prevention Act. 160 The court went beyond Unocal,
however, in stating firmly that "torture, summary execution, and
arbitrary detention constitute 'fully recognized violations of
international law"' that support claims under Alien Tort Claims Act
because they are inconsistent with the basic principles of "equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family" recognized by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 16 1 Moreover, the court
recognized "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" as well as "crimes
162
against humanity" as violations of accepted international norms.
Violations of international rights to "personal security" and "peaceful
assembly and expression" also supported a cause of action. 163 With
respect to the state action requirement emphasized in Unocal's defense,
the Wiwa court followed Kadic in holding that private actors could be
liable without finding state action in two categories of international law
violations: genocide and war crimes. 164 Allegations of "a substantial
degree of cooperation between corporate defendants and the Nigerian
government" were enough to support the state action requirement for
165
other categories of international law violations.

WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 632-43 (2000); Leslie Wells, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Why
Unocal Should be Liable Under U.S. Law for Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 35, 65-71 (1998). For further general discussion and recommendations,
see also David I. Becker, Note, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 183, 200-07 (1998); Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Note, CorporateViolator:
The Alien Tort Liability of TransnationalCorporationsfor Human Rights Abuses Abroad,
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 359, 377-87 (1999).

156.
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2002).
157.
Id. at *2-3.
158.
Id. at *1-5.
159.
Id. at *5-7.
160.
Id. at *8-15.
161.
Id. at *17 (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995)
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble and arts. 9-11).
162.
Wiwa, supra note 156, at *21-32.
163.
Id. at *33-36.
164.
Id. at *37-38 (citing Kadic).
165.
Id. at *40-41.
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If any doubt remained after Unocal, Wiwa serves a clear warning to
business corporations that they risk substantial liability if they
participate in international violations of basic human rights in
cooperation or coordination with a foreign government. Wiwa appears to
expand the range of prohibited behavior to include a range of basic
human rights. Business corporations in the future would therefore be
well-advised legally as well as ethically to steer clear of business
relationships with governments or military forces that operate outside
the pale of international recognition and acceptability.
C. Ethical Constraintson the War Business
Even if Unocal's dealings with the Myanmar army did not rise to
the level of a violation of international human rights as a legal matter,
and even if Royal Dutch/Shell and its officers eventually prevail or settle
in Wiwa, these cases illustrate that basic moral understandings should
constrain corporate conduct. 166 It is difficult to see how Unocal can
morally justify its actions in Myanmar given repeated warnings from
government officials and nongovernmental organizations of persistent
practices of slave labor, forced relocations, and other human rights
violations. 167 Unocal's complicity may not reach the moral baseness of
168
actively cooperating with Nazis, but the company's actions come close.
Although the facts have not yet been determined at trial or by a court in
Wiwa, similarly shocking behavior and complicity seem to have
69
characterized at least some of Royal Dutch/Shell's actions in Nigeria. 1
170
Moral shame and blame should therefore accrue.
If the pipeline in Myanmar were not enough, the Unocal
Corporation also provides another lesson in how to choose the wrong
business partner when it negotiated an arrangement with the Taliban in

166.
A similar analysis may apply to the French company, Total, in Unocal as well,
even though the company escaped legal liability. See supra note 144.
167.
Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1300-04.
168.
See generally id. at 1309-10 (discussing Nazi cases).
169.
For detailed accounts of the Nigerian activities of Royal Dutch/Shell and
conclusions about them, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Ethics in EmergingMarkets:
Introduction, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1153, 1161-63 (1997); William E. Newbury &
Thomas Gladwin, Case Study: Shell and NigerianOil, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A
PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 539-64 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 6th ed.
1999); Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Held
Liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 927, 958-63 (1998). For a general eye witness account of human rights problems in
Nigeria, see also Okechukwu Oko, Lawyers in Chains: Restrictions on Human Rights
Advocacy under Nigeria'sMilitaryRegimes, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 257 (1997); Okechukwu
Oko, ConsolidatingDemocracy on a Troubled Continent:A Challengefor Lawyers in Africa,
33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 573 (2000).

170.
Cf. DRINAN, supra note 13; David A. Skeel, Shaming in CorporateLaw, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1811, 1858-66 (2001) (discussing the importance of shaming in corporate
governance, but with different ends in view).
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Afghanistan to help protect construction of a planned oil pipeline across
the country in the 1990s.17 1 Fortunately for the company, this deal was
abandoned by 1999, perhaps in part as a result of political pressure from
feminist groups, but more likely as a consequence of the rising infamy of
Osama bin Laden. 172 Few, if any, corporations can maintain that it is
ethical to make deals with terrorists. 173 Like pirates or Nazis,
international terrorists belong to the category of hostis humani

generis.174 If doing business with terrorists is not a violation of
international law, it arguably should be.
In addition to following the law, both Milton Friedman and the
Principles of Corporate Governance recognize ethical constraints on

business beyond formal legal requirements. 175 Ethical business
practices do not begin and end with the law. 176 Again, as Melvin
Eisenberg writes, section 2.01's discussions of "ethical considerations"
express a common sense understanding about corporate governance:
"We don't want a society in which people are encouraged to become
don't want a society
amoral when they become corporate executives. We177
door."'
the
at
ethics
their
check
managers
in which
Another example from an illustration in the Principlesof Corporate
Governance, adapted further by Eisenberg in a recent article, should be
sufficient to prove the general point that compulsory moral obligations

should sometimes constrain a corporate action even when it is not
technically illegal:
Corporation D is a large publicly held corporation engaged in the
manufacture of powerful computers, with annual earnings of $60-70
million. D has been negotiating with a North African country for the sale
of three computers. Negotiations were essentially complete, and a
contract ready to sign, when the State Department announced that within
the next few days the President would adopt an executive order
prohibiting the shipment of certain high-technology products to that
country, because its conduct was highly inimical to the United States and
threatened the stability of the entire area. In other words, the State
Department was going to add the country to a list of states that sponsored

AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN
171.
CENTRAL ASIA 170-75 (2000).

Id. But cf. Milton Bearden, Afghanistan, Graveyardof Empires, FOREIGN AFF.
172.
(Nov.-Dec. 2001), at 17, 26 (recognizing that U.S. firms had abandoned hopes of building
an Afghanistan pipeline with Taliban support by 1997).
See MICAHEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 197-98 (discussing the methods
173.
and tactics of terrorism).
See supra note 142 and accompanying text. For the controversial argument
174.
that IBM knowingly stepped over the moral line in its business dealings with Nazi
Germany, see EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2001).

Again, Friedman and the ALI do not use similar terms. See supranotes 75, 76
175.
and accompanying text. Friedman's reference to "ethical custom" is much more general
than the ALI's discussion of various ethical qualifications.
See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01, cmt. g
176.
(discussing reasons for not following the law).
Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 5.
177.
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international terrorism. The State Department announced, however, that
the formal legal prohibition would not be applied to contracts made before
the order became effective, but urged voluntary compliance as of the date
of the announcement. It was clear that when the executive order became
effective it would apply to D's computers. D estimates that the sale would
generate earnings of $6 million, and that short- and long-term costs
entailed by completing the sale would not be significant. D nevertheless
decides not to sign the contract, because its officials believe that sale of the
computers would contravene a strong and clearly announced national
1 78
policy. D's action is not only proper but ethically compelled.

I have changed the facts in this illustration slightly, adding the ethical
"hot button" of a State Department listing of the North African country
as a state sponsor of international terrorism, and I have stated the
ethical result more strongly than does the ALI or Eisenberg. But the
basic moral lesson is the same. Although the American Law Institute's
commentary suggests that D might be allowed to sign such a contract
under the principle of following its economic objective, 179 it does not
require much argument to convince most managers that entering such a
contract would be morally prohibited.
This example also provides an illustration of how section 2.01 of the
ALI's Principlesof CorporateGovernance does not exhaust the analysis
required of corporate managers, especially high-level executives. Section
2.01 recognizes "ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business[,]" 1 80 which echoes
Milton Friedman's allowance for "ethical custom." 18 1 Notice, however,
the circularity in both of these formulations. Someone must make the
ethical decisions that eventually become "reasonably regarded" by the
business community as "ethical customs. ' 18 2
The example of
Corporation D's computer sales to a country that knowingly "harbors
terrorists," as well as many other real-world cases such as Unocal's
investment in Myanmar or Afghanistan, indicate that much moral
ground remains to be tilled to determine the appropriate ethical conduct
required in transnational business.18 3 Answers to tough moral business
problems cannot rely solely on the experience of previous generations or
entrenched customs. Previous moral answers themselves have sources
in basic principles and reasoning, and new moral situations require fresh
reasoning, if not new principles, to resolve. "Following the crowd" is not
an acceptable ethical strategy.

178.
Adapted from Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 7-8, adapted in turn from
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01, illus. 21, at 69.
179.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01, illus. 22, at 69.
180.
Id. § 2.01(b)(2).
181.
Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
182.
See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, supranote 76, § 2.01(b)(2); see Friedman, supra
note 75.
183.
See supra text accompanying notes 171-72; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp.
2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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D. Permissive Business Ethics and War
The third and last exception to the economic objective provided in
section 2.01 permits corporations to "devote a reasonable amount of
resources [that is, donate] to public welfare, humanitarian, educational,
and philanthropic purposes." 18 4 This exception is recognized in so-called
charitable contribution statutes in almost all states.18 5 Commentators
have added the limitation of "reasonableness," presumably to curtail
the love for some
corporations from acting too lovingly, especially when
186
is expressed by giving away other people's money.
Again, Eisenberg gives a good example of the permissive ethical
exception relevant to present circumstances: "[S]uppose America is at
war. C Corporation devotes corporate resources for the purpose of
furthering the war effort, rather than for maximizing the profits on the
commodities it produces and then sells-for example, by holding down
prices to prevent inflation.' 18 7 Eisenberg argues that corporate behavior
supporting the war effort may have a rational economic justification if"it
is in the economic interest of all American corporations that America
should win the war."188 Then, business corporations would face a
collective action problem, or prisoner's dilemma, but if they coordinated
their actions and "all devoted resources to the war effort, they would all
be better off."' 8 9
This argument is correct, as far as it goes. Notice, however, that
some complications arise on closer examination of Eisenberg's example.
The economic interests of different corporations may quickly diverge in a
war economy. Different corporations may thus have different economic
interests in going along with a collective effort to support a war. In part
because economic interests will diverge in terms of wartime profitmaking opportunities, collective action problems arise for the political
effectiveness of moral exhortations to sacrifice profits for war. 190
More importantly, Eisenberg's example of C Corporation provides
a
an illustration of the permissive ethical principle. 191 For a just war,192
business corporation may provide a "reasonable" amount of support.
Lockheed Martin, for example, again provides a contemporary example
in having set up an "American Spirit Fund" initially supported with a
corporate donation of one million dollars in the wake of the September

184.
185.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76,
Id. § 2.01 Reporter's Note, at 72.

186.

Id.; see also Prunty, supra note 2.

187.
188.
189.
190.
& n.1l.
191.
192.

§ 2.01(b)(3).

Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 12.
Id.
Id.
For further discussion of these limitations, see WALTZ, supra note 8, at 193-96
See Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 12.
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b)(3).
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11 attack. 193 Such permissive ethical behavior is within the standard
ethical understanding of the nature and purposes of the corporation.
Indeed, many state statutes explicitly authorize corporations to depart
from the economic objective for the purposes of contributing resources to
the public welfare "in time of war or other national emergency.' 94
The clear moral issues presented by the prospect of participating in
war helps to clarify the moral issues faced by business corporations in
section 2.01. Following the incisive analysis of Donald Schwartz, one
should distinguish between (a) ethical constraints that are arguably
imposed by section 2.01's admonition that corporate managers "may take
into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business" and (b) permissive
ethical behavior that allows for a corporation affirma tively to contribute
"a reasonable amount of resources" to charities, education, public
welfare, or other philanthropic or humanitarian causes. 195 Although
both ethical constraints and ethical permissions are exceptions to the
profit-making economic objective, the distinction between them makes
sense in terms of the gravity of different kinds of moral decisions.
In many situations, moral philosophers argue that it is worse to
commit a serious wrong than to avoid doing a good act. 196 To put the
idea in philosophical terms: other things being equal, directly causing
harm is very often worse than allowing harm to occur. 19 7 A common
example discussed in philosophy is the difference between "killing and
letting die."' 9 8 Both are bad, but intentional killing is usually thought to
be worse than various inactions that could have saved lives. 199 Murder,
for example, is morally worse than failing to give a donation that may
save the lives of starving people in Afghanistan. 200 In the context of war
and corporate governance, then, it seems worse to contribute weapons of
war to a tyrannical regime that result in the unjustified deaths of many

193.
194.

See Lockheed Martin, supra note 114.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2001) (corporations "shall have the power

to . . . make donation for the public welfare . . . and in time of war or other national

emergency in aid thereof. . . ."); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 2001)
(corporations have the power "to make donations, irrespective of corporate benefit, for the
public welfare ... and in time or war or other national emergency in aid thereof...."). In
addition, corporate constituency statutes in Florida, Ohio, and other states include "[t]he
economy of the state and nation" as among the various interests that corporate directors
and managers may consider in making business decisions. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.59(E)(2) (2001).
195.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
196.
See Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Caseof RequiredRescue,
GEO. L.J. 605, 659 (2001).
197.
See, e.g., WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION 149-74 (1993).
198.

For a recent collection of essays on the topic, see KILLING AND LETTING DIE

(Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross eds., 2d ed. 1994).
199.
The distinction between killing and letting die is often considered a specific
instance of a more general distinction between doing and allowing. Alastair Norcross,
Introduction to the Second Edition, in KILLING AND LETTING DIE, supra note 198, at 9.
200.
See id.
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people than to fail to make charitable contributions to a good cause in
society-including the cause of a just war or good government. 20 1 The
philosophical complications in this area are considerable and require
references to specific situations to work out correctly, but here it is
enough to show that section 2.01's division between what might be
thought of as ethical duties and ethical permissions may well make
substantive philosophical sense. 202 The world is morally complicatedas well as complicated in many other ways. Therefore, it makes sense to
identify clear moral constraints as opposed to moral permissions. The
seriously when a personformer, of course, should be taken much more
203
action.
of
choice
a
or corporation-faces
Still, one worries about the fact that section 2.01 refers to moral
constraints themselves only as "permissive. '20 4 One might interpret this
provision to allow for quite evil corporate acts as long as they are
legal.20 5 Only a cursory reflection on the problems of war crimes,
genocide, and other major human rights violations discussed above
should be sufficient to dispel this notion. Section 2.01 probably should
recognize that at least some moral requirements are imperative, not
merely "permissive" or "voluntary."20 6 The ALI's Principlesof Corporate
Governance err on the side of caution by avoiding a straightforward
statement that corporations must adhere to ethical as well as legal
constraints. 20 7 This strategy of avoidance, however, is dangerous given

See id.
201.
See id.; see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b).
202.
203.
The distinction between moral constraints and permissions does not
correspond with a further subset of ethically "superogatory" behavior. This term is used to
refer to unusually good or heroic behavior of a kind that most people cannot be expected to
perform. Very brave acts for good ends in the face of grave risks of death, for example, are
praised but not expected as a rule. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, A World Apart? An
Essay on the Autonomy of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 747, 751 n.6 (1998) (describing "the
familiar ethical distinction between required behavior and superogatory behavior that
merits special praise as beyond the call of duty.") In the terms employed here, a
corporation could act in a "superogatory" fashion in promoting, for example, a peaceful
world above and beyond the expectations of the public. But this would be an exceptional
kind of permissive ethical behavior; other permissive ethical behavior may be expectedsuch as some form or amount of corporate charitable contribution toward peace or a just
war-that is not superogatory.
The ALI's official comment goes so far as to state explicitly that "Section
204.
2.01(b)(2) does not impose a legal obligation to take ethical considerations into account."
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01 cmt. h, at 64. It goes on to say that "the
absence of a legal obligation ... does not mean that corporate decisionmakers are not
subject to the same ethical obligations of other members of society." Id. But this doublenegative construction does not make the statement in favor of corporate ethical obligations
very strong. Moreover, in some cases, particularly when the support of wars may be
involved, corporations may, in fact, have greater responsibilities than ordinary citizens in
making ethical decisions whether or not to support military activities, given the likelihood
of their decisions having a larger social impact.
205.
See id.
206.
See id.
See id.
207.
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that some business corporations inevitably face great ethical
responsibilities in matters of war and peace. 208 At least, corporate
lawyers-and legal and business academics-should make clear that
following the law, or even following the crowd, does not permit a
corporation to transgress fundamental moral boundaries.
III. WAR AND ECONOMICS: TOWARD THE INSTITUTION OF PEACE?
Even the most hard-bitten law-and-economist must admit when
pressed that stark moral choices posed by war should constrain business
enterprises. In modern societies, a business corporation may have a
primary objective of "enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain,"
but this objective is grounded on an implicit assumption of relative
peace. In other words, the profit-seeking objective of a business
corporation must find its limits in the political will of democratic states
as expressed in positive law. When the peaceful legal framework is
shattered by war, even the limits of law are insufficient. Doing business
with pirates, slave traders, or terrorists cannot be morally justified, even
if international law cannot yet reach these wrongs. Conspiring or
cooperating with Nazis or Al Qaeda cannot be morally condoned, even if
20 9
legally permitted.
Even though the Principlesof Corporate Governance say nothing
directly about values and principles of political democracy, these values
and principles are implicit in the exception to the "economic objective"
given by the "boundaries set by law. ' 210 The "ethical considerations"
mentioned generally by the American Law Institute are also essential to

determining the actions that business corporations should take when
faced with situations of war or situations that are likely to involve
fighting wars.2 11 These are principles that should find international
scope and application.
Corporate decisions to participate in and profit from war-even for
a just cause-carry moral as well as legal responsibility. In commenting

208.
See generally id.
209.
One can imagine circumstances that would morally permit transactions with
"bad" actors, including even pirates or terrorists. For example, a corporation might
knowingly cooperate with an intelligence agency of a "good" democratic government in
order to penetrate a criminal or "enemy" organization-such as Al Qaeda. Even so, the
corporation must observe moral limits. When private entities are recruited in this manner
for public ends, morally gray boundaries often arise that demand conscious and thoughtful
navigation. Similar moral problems arise easily, for example, in the context of private
military companies. See supra text accompanying notes 90-103.

210.
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01. For extended discussions
of the importance of following the law in corporate governance-and establishing
appropriate incentives to do so-see Deborah A. DeMott, OrganizationalIncentives to Care
about the Law, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1997); Greenfield, supra note 23.
211.
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 76, § 2.01(b)(2).
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on U.S. military participation in the war against Serbia on behalf of
Kosovo, a law professor perceptively observed: "As I read the national
pulse, what Americans don't want is for their children to be sent into
harm's way to guarantee higher profits for corporations. ."..-212 Wars
and corporate participation in wars must have a higher moral and
213
political justification than profit and shareholder gain.
The larger justifications for war include basic moral and political
principles of freedom, democracy, security, and peace. I will not attempt
to argue here which of these higher principles may be necessary or
214
sufficient to justify violent conflict and intentional killing.
Contemplation of the truth of modern war and the participation of
business corporations in it should convince even the most economicallyoriented legal theorists that some higher moral values must play a
significant role in contemporary corporate law and governance, at least
when matters of war and peace are at stake. Business corporations, as
well as nation-states and individual citizens, cannot avoid confronting
important moral issues of responsibility when they participate actively
in war.
Finally, to conclude on a more positive note, the institutions of
business, including business corporations and the competition of
organized markets, may contribute to a social psychological solution to
the long-standing problem of war in human society. On one hand,
modern business corporations supply the means of modern war. They
may profit from war, and this fact raises a very difficult political issue of
isolating the business interests of "the military industrial complex" from
political decision making about war and peace. 215 On the other hand,
business competition may also provide what William James called "the
moral equivalent of war" needed for the permanent institution of
peace. 216 Like sports and perhaps law, business competition may
217
provide a social psychological substitute for human aggression.

212.
Robert F. Turner, Kosovo: Legal andPolicy Implications, 10 U.S.A.F. ACAD. J.
LEGAL STUD. 67, 85 (1999/2000).
213.
See id.
214.
For leading treatments of the political and ethical problems of war, see
generally WALTZ, supra note 8; see also MICHAEL WALZER, JUSTAND UNJUST WARS (1977).
For more recent discussions, agreeing with Walzer that even just wars must be fought
with ethical restraint, see JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, MORALITY AND CONTEMPORARY
WARFARE (1999); WARD THOMAS, THE ETHICS OF DESTRUCTION: NORMS AND FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2001).

215.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the
American People, Jan. 17, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Dwight D. Eisenhower 1038 (1961).
216.
William James, The Moral Equivalent of War, in BEST AMERICAN ESSAYS OF
THE CENTURY 45 (Joyce Carol Oates ed., 2000) (1910).
217.
There is a debate in the literature on war about whether human aggression is
a natural instinct or culturally learned. For a short review of competing accounts, see
KEEGAN, supra note 57, at 18-27. Whatever its origins, however, modern war-as opposed
to crime or other social violence-aims at specific objectives which are often predatory. To
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According to James, "[h]istory is a bath of blood. '218 Today, after two
world wars have been fought since James wrote his famous essay, some
still say "peace" when they mean "war expected" or even "permanent,
unceasing" war. 219
Building a global civilization that includes
competitive business enterprises and economic markets may, perhaps,
point the direction toward a "substitute for war's disciplinary function,"
as well as for its psychological and even aesthetic attractiveness to
220
human beings.
William James also observed that "war-making is due to definite
motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, just
like any other form of enterprise. ' 22' Business corporations have been
instruments of war, but they can also serve the cause of "the institution
223
of peace. '222 If "war starts in the minds of men," then "so does peace."
In a globalizing and increasingly interdependent world, there is a strong
argument for "an intellectual duty to proclaim the inconceivability of
war."2 24 To do so, however, does not itself advance the practical
conditions of peace.22 5 Building institutions of peace will require, again
in the words of James, "a future when acts of war shall be formally
outlawed as between civilized peoples. '226 New and improved structures
of international law, including "institutionalized restraints and
institutionalized methods of altering and adjusting interests," will be
required.2 27 This future civilization, however, will also need large
business corporations not only to perform an economic objective, but also
to abide by the law and to act ethically. Then, perhaps, we can hope to
'228
establish at least improved probabilities for "a reign of peace.

the extent that other social institutions can channel human desires for acquisitive
competition-whether natural or cultural in origin-the temptations to resort to war
might be diminished. Sports, law, and business may share in partly meeting this general
social need.
218.
James, supra note 216, at 46.
219.
Id. at 47. Even Plato said that "peace" was only another name for "incessant"
war. PLATO, LAWS, I.626A (quoted in VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE,
supra note 9, at 440).
220.
See generally James, supra note 216, at 51.
221.
Id. at 52.
222.
Cf. MICHAEL HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER (2001).

223.

Id. at 5.

224.

UMBERTO Eco, FIVE MORAL PIECES 16 (2001).

225.
For a practical argument along these lines, see WALTZ, supra note 8, at 1-2.
226.
James, supra note 216, at 53.
227.
WALTZ, supra note 8, at 231.
228.
See generally James, supra note 216, at 52. As Waltz argues, it may ask too
much to hope for a true and everlasting peace on earth. But, we might at least in improve
the odds by "decreasing the incidence of war" and "increasing the chances of peace."
WALTZ, supra note 8, at 1.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Sadly and tragically, peace will not come without the collective
monopolization of force that makes war possible. The threat of new
enemies, including international terrorists, "requires that the
responsible powers, committed to... peace, must be able to deploy forces
of the highest quality, human as well as technological, to any part of the
globe at all times." 229 Clausewitz wrote memorably that
If bloody slaughter is a horrible spectacle, then it should only be a reason
for treating war with more respect, but not for making the sword we bear
blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until once again
someone steps in with a sword that is sharp and hews away the arms from
230
our bodies.

Many Americans feel that exactly this sort of direct and brutal blow
the modern world, the
occurred against its society on September 11. In 23
state system remains essential to achieve peace. '
Business corporations also have an essential role to play in the
enterprise of peace, even as they contribute to the modern armories of
war. Corporations-and the social and political institutions that
regulate them-must take their responsibilities seriously and with the
proper ethical gravity. War is not merely a game for business to play for
profits. If war is a game, it is a very serious one that requires ethical
restraint, political judgment, and legal regulation, as well as economic
23 2
calculation.
In this Article, many practical answers to the question of how
business corporations can be better regulated or how business executives
can make better moral decisions with respect to war have been left
unanswered. I hope at least to have raised these issues as serious ones
deserving of academic and practical attention. Useful future research
might include the following list of topics:
*

What current national and international regulations constrain
corporate profit-making in supplying the goods and services of
war? How can national laws such as the Arms Export Control
Act and the Export Administration Act be improved or
supplemented? What lessons may be learned from other
countries? What would a comparative study of these laws

229.

KEEGAN, supra note 57, at 68.

230.

WALTZ, supra note 8, at 221 (quoting Clausewitz).

See HOWARD, supra note 222, at 103 (pointing out that "the trouble is that the
231.
state not only makes war possible, it also makes peace possible," because peace only
"results from agreement between states").
See supra note 8.
232.
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recommend in terms of possible international regulation in this
area?
Should special laws constrain the participation of militaryrelated businesses in political lobbying and campaign financing?
If so, how?
How should the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim
Prevention Act be interpreted or amended with respect to claims
against business corporations, as well as individuals, by victims
of human rights violations? How would such interpretations or
amendments either promote peace or be counterproductive to
this end?
Should the novel and growing form of "private military
companies" that appear to be in the thriving business of
providing mercenary military services be regulated at the
international level? If so, how? Are there benefits to private
military companies in a world in which the relative power of
nation-states is declining?
How should the law of corporate governance-both national and
international-be changed to reflect a realistic and humane
conception of the importance of business corporations in matters
of war and peace, as well as the promotion of economic wellbeing? How can corporate executives be given the flexibility to
act ethically on these issues, without giving them the latitude to
abuse their power and authority in their own self-interests?
What are the current best practices of corporations in the
defense industry in terms of ethical and legal compliance
programs? How can ethical and legal behavior in the defense
industry be encouraged both nationally and internationally?
What kinds of ethical issues do different companies in different
businesses related to warfare face? What does the emerging
discipline of business ethics offer in terms of rational approaches
to solving these ethical dilemmas?
How can business corporations act permissibly, within their
legal power, to promote global peace as well as prosperity? How
could superogatory or heroic corporate actions in promoting
peace be recognized or rewarded?

Beginning to answer some of these important questions in theory and
practice will bring human society closer to understanding how one of the
great organizational inventions of our time-the business corporationmay better contribute to the goal of global peace.

